Two distinct learning mechanisms are considered for a population of agents who engage in decentralized search for the common optimum. An agent may choose to learn via innovation (individual learning) or via imitation (social learning). The agents are endowed with heterogeneous skills in engaging in the two modes of learning. When the agents choose imitation, they also choose whom to learn from. This leads to the emergence of a social learning network among agents in the population. This paper focuses on the impact the endowed learning skills have on the individual's choice of learning mechanism as well as the micro and macro structure of the evolving network. Finally, it explores the impact the degree of environmental volatility has on the structure of such networks.
Introduction
It has been noted that an individual embedded in a social system may employ two distinct modes of learning in solving problems -innovation (individual learning) and imitation (social learning):
Sometimes scientists modify their cognitive states as results of asocial interactions, sometimes they change their minds through social exchanges. The obvious exemplars for the former are the solitary experimentalist at work with apparatus and samples and the lone field observer attending to the organisms ... Paradigm cases of conversations with peers are those episodes in which one scientist is told something by another (and believes it) or when a change in commitment is caused by the reading of a text. The point of the distinction is evidently to separate those episodes that (very roughly) consist in finding things out for oneself from those in which one relies on others ... [Kitcher (1993) , p. 60] Does a high level of social knowledge require a high level of social interaction? ... In principle an impressive aggregate knowledge might be acquired if each member independently explores and discovers the facts of interest. A hallmark of human culture, however, is to enhance the social fund of knowledge by sharing discovered facts with one another. [Goldman (2003) , p. 103]
The issue of individual versus social learning is central to the long-term performance of social systems such as business organizations and teams engaged in recurrent problem-solving with multiple agents. Effective learning at the organizational level requires both individual learning and social learning at the agent level: Individual learning by an agent increases the degree of variation in the set of ideas available for adoption (thereby improving the organization's ability to adapt to changes in the long run), while social learning facilitates the organization-wide diffusion of those ideas that are already proven useful (thereby improving the organization's performance in the short run). The two modes of learning are, hence, complements at the organizational level.
While the intuition behind the complementarity among the two learning modes is rather straightforward, understanding the extent to which it is realized at the organizational level requires a careful examination of the following three issues. First, how is this complementary relationship realized in a decentralized organization where the individual agents choose the learning modes autonomously and in parallel ? 1 Second, when social learning is chosen by an individual, that individual will need 1 To see the relevant forces behind this issue, observe that an individual with limited time resource and cognitive capacity can only pursue one mode of learning at any given point in time and, hence, must choose how to learn. Given the group of agents who must make autonomous choices between the two modes of learning, the organization then faces two unintended consequences (trade-offs): 1) Since individual learning and social learning are substitutes at the agent level, the pursuit of one learning mode by an individual comes at the cost of foregone benefits realizable from using the other mode (both for the individual and for the organization); 2) Diffusion of a successful idea, while improving the to identify whom she will learn from, and this is determined by the social network she possesses at that point. This social network is likely to evolve over time, however, as each individual adjusts the likelihood of returning to a given person for learning on the basis of the success or failure of her decision to learn from that person. What kinds of networks are likely to develop as the consequence of this process? Third, when learning takes place in a dynamic environment, how does the extent of environmental turbulence affect which learning mechanism individuals choose over time and what types of structure will the learning networks evolve to attain? This paper explores these issues by developing an agent-based computational model of the decentralized process by which ideas are generated by individual agents (through individual learning) and diffused in the organization (through social learning).
The model entails a population of myopic, though adaptive, agents searching for a common optimum (organizational goal) in the space of possible things that one can do. The agents choose whether to allocate their efforts to discovering new ideas -innovation -or to observing the ideas of others -imitation. When they engage in imitation, agents decide from whom to learn, which takes the form of establishing links in a social network in terms of how observation probabilities are distributed across individuals. These probabilities are then adjusted by the individuals over time via reinforcement learning. The knowledge creation/diffusion process occurs in the context of a changing environment as represented by stochastic movement in the common optimum. Whether or not an individual's effort to innovate or imitate is productive depends on whether his or her inherent ability lies in generating new ideas or in establishing communication links with other agents. The agents are assumed to be heterogeneous in these capabilities. Since the knowledge transfer in our organization is carried out through a purely decentralized process with no centralized coordination, this is a model of informal organizational learning.
Note that there are two distinct stages to individual decision making in the proposed model.
The first stage looks at the choice between individual and social learning. The second stage, which becomes relevant only when social learning is chosen in the first stage, addresses the individual's choice of whom to observe. Given the endowed skill differentials (i.e., innovativeness vs. connectivity) among individuals, I then address a series of issues involving the choices made at the individual short-run performance of the individual and the organization, tends to reduce the degree of variation in the existing pool of ideas, thereby weakening the organization's ability to adapt in the long run. In a dynamic environment in which learning must go on continually, the exact manner in which these trade-offs affect the organizational performance will depend on the degree of environmental turbulence. level in terms of learning mode and the consequent outcomes at the organizational level as implied by the endogenous structure of the social learning network. More specifically, I ask: How does agent heterogeneity in learning skills feed into the private choices they make in terms of allocating their efforts between individual learning (innovation) and social learning (imitation through social interactions)? Do agents with higher absolute innovation (imitation) skills necessarily choose to engage in innovation (imitation) with a greater probability? Do highly innovative individuals perform better than less innovative individuals? In the course of engaging in social learning, individuals get to develop informal knowledge networks -who learns from whom -within the organization. What are the structural properties of the networks thus developed? How does the exact combination of the learning skills endowed by each individual determine the emergent structure of the social learning network? How are these relationships affected by the degree of volatility in the environment?
The next section provides a brief review of the related literature. The formal model is then presented in Section 3. Section 4 describes the design of computational experiments performed in the paper. How the heterogeneity in learning skills affects the steady-state choices between innovation and imitation is discussed in Section 5. Section 6 provides a detailed analysis of the structure and performance of the emergent network. Section 7 offers concluding remarks.
Review of the Literature
How the individuals' decisions to engage in innovation or imitation affect an organization is closely related to the force identified in the organizational learning literature as exploration vs. exploitation trade-off. March (1991) , a classic paper in this line of research, considers the role of an organizational code that adapts over time and determines the relative rates of exploration and exploitation. The agents in the organization learn from the code, but the code itself also adapts to the beliefs of better-performing agents. In that model, the "organizational code" is a device that is exogenously specified. Instead of assuming the existence of a "code," my model replaces it with a social learning network which is endogenously developed through the dynamic choices of learning modes made by the individual agents -i.e., agents learn directly from one another rather than indirectly from the organizational code. It, thus, provides a detailed look at the very mechanism that brings about the organizational code. The exploration/exploitation trade-off is also examined in Siggelkow and Levinthal (2003) though their focus is on the role of the formal hierarchy (in the allocation of authority) in problem-solving. I replace the formal hierarchy with its fixed links with an informal endogenous network and thus address a different set of questions.
The model in this paper is also closely related to the one used in Harrington (2005, 2007) . The objective of Chang and Harrington (2005) was to characterize network structure and population performance and explore their dependence on the reliability of the communications technology, as well as the innovativeness of agents. Contrary to the model in this paper, Chang and Harrington (2005) assumed agents with homogeneous learning skills -i.e., all agents had the equal level of imitation capability (determined by the communication technology available to all) and of innovation capability. When the communication technology is poor, it was found, not surprisingly, that technological improvements enhance performance. What was surprising was that if the communication technology is sufficiently effective, further improvements are detrimental. Better communications allows more social learning among agents, which results in agents having very similar solutions. The ensuing lack of diversity within the social network meant that the population of agents is ill-equipped to adapt to a changing environment. Thus, a better communications technology can lead to too structured a network from the perspective of promoting innovation. The detailed structural properties of the network, however, were not examined in that paper and that is what I intend to explore in this paper.
Chang and Harrington (2007) allows agents with heterogeneous learning skills, but only in a limited way. It considers a population that is comprised of three types: Innovators who are highly productive in generating new ideas, Imitators who are highly productive in identifying and copying the ideas of others, and Regular Agents who are moderately productive at both activities. Those individuals belonging to a given type have common learning skills. In this framework, the study investigated the architecture of the networks that evolve and how the emergence of connectors depends on the distribution of the types as defined above. The present paper generalizes this approach by allowing the learning skills of the agents to be uniformly heterogeneous in both dimensions. Furthermore, we attain a richer set of results through a detailed examination of the actual social learning networks generated with the evolved imitation probabilities. The degree of heterogeneity between two methods vectors, z i and z j , is measured using "Hamming distance" which is defined as the number of positions for which the corresponding bits differ. We shall denote it by D(z i , z j ).
In period t, the population faces a common goal vector, b z(t), which is also a binary vector of H · d
dimensions. The degree of turbulence in task environments is captured by intertemporal variability in b z(t), the details of which are explained in Section 3.4.
The individuals are uninformed about the goal vector b z(t) ex ante, but engage in "search" to get as close to it as possible. Given H tasks with d bits in each task and the goal vector b z(t), the period-t performance of individual i is then measured by π i (t), where
Hence, the performance of agent i is greater as the Hamming distance to the goal vector is shorter.
It reaches its maximum value of H · d when agent i fully attains its goal such that z i (t) = b z(t).
Modeling Innovation and Imitation
In a given period, an individual's search for the current optimum is carried out through two distinct mechanisms, innovation and imitation. Innovation occurs when an individual independently discovers and considers for implementation a random method for a randomly chosen task. Imitation is when an individual selects someone (probabilistically) in the organization and then observes and considers implementing the method currently deployed by that agent for one randomly chosen task. The relevant operation has five tasks. In each task, there are four distinct methods that can be tried:
(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0) , and (1, 1). Agent i with the above current methods vector is then employing the method (0, 1) for task 1, (0, 1) for task 2, (1, 1) for task 3, (0, 0) for task 4, and (1, 1) for task 5.
The Hamming distance between i's current methods vector and the goal vector is four. Suppose i chooses to innovate in task 1. For task 1, she randomly selects a method from the set of all available methods, {(0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1)}. Let us assume that she comes up with the idea of (1, 1) for task 
Endogenizing Choices for Innovation and Imitation
We assume that in each period an individual may engage in either innovation or imitation by using the network. How exactly does an individual choose between innovation and imitation and, if he chooses to imitate, how does he decide whom to imitate? We model this as a two-stage stochastic decision process with reinforcement learning. Figure 1 describes the timing of decisions in our model.
In stage 1 of period t, individual i is in possession of the current methods vector, z i (t), and chooses to innovate with probability q i (t) and imitate with probability 1 − q i (t). If the agent chooses to innovate then, with probability µ in i , he or she generates an idea which is a randomly chosen task h ∈ {1, . . . , H} and a randomly chosen method for that task such that the experimental method vector, denoted z 0 i (t), has the same methods as z i (t) in all tasks except for the chosen task h. The method for the chosen task h will be replaced with the randomly chosen method, as explained in the example provided in the previous sub-section. This experimental vector is adopted by i if and only if its adoption decreases the Hamming distance between the agent and the current goal vector, b z(t), in which case the methods vector in period t + 1 is the experimental vector, z 0 i (t). 2 Otherwise, the experimental vector is discarded and the methods vector in t + 1 is the same as z i (t). Alternatively, when the individual fails to generate an idea, which occurs with probability 1 − µ in i , the methods vector in t + 1 remains the same as z i (t).
Now suppose individual i chooses to imitate in stage 1. Given that the agent decides to imitate someone else, he or she taps into the network to make an observation. Tapping into the network is also a probabilistic event, in which with probability µ im i the agent is connected to the network, while with probability 1 − µ im i the agent fails to connect. An agent who is connected then enters stage 2 of the decision process in which he or she must select another agent to be studied for possible imitation. Let p j i (t) be the probability with which i observes j in period t so
If agent i observes another agent l, that observation involves a randomly chosen task h and the current method used by agent l in that task, z h l (t). Let z 00 i (t) be the experimental vector such that it has the same methods as in z i (t) for all tasks except for task h, and the method in h is replaced with z h l (t). Adoption or rejection of the observed method is based on the Hamming distance criterion such that it is adopted if and only if it reduces the Hamming distance to the goal vector b z(t): the new methods vector in t + 1 is, hence, the experimental vector, z 00 i (t), in the case of adoption. Otherwise, it remains the same as z i (t). Again, if the agent fails to connect to the network, which occurs with probability 1 − µ im i , the new methods vector remains the same as z i (t).
The probabilities, q i (t) and
are adjusted over time by individual agents according to a reinforcement learning rule. 3 We adopt a version of the ExperienceWeighted Attraction (EWA) learning rule as described in Camerer and Ho (1999) . Under this rule, an agent has a numerical attraction for each possible action. The learning rule specifies how attractions are updated by the agent's experience and how the probabilities of choosing different actions depend on attractions. The main feature of the rule is that a positive outcome realized from a course of action reinforces the likelihood of that same action being chosen again.
Using the EWA-rule, q i (t) is adjusted each period on the basis of evolving attraction measures, A in i (t) for innovation and A im i (t) for imitation. The following process drives the evolution of A in i (t)
and A im i (t). If the agent chose to pursue Innovation and discovered and then adopted the new idea, the attraction measure for Innovation increases by 1 -i.e., A in i (t + 1) = A in i (t) + 1. If the agent chose to innovate but was unsuccessful (either because he or she failed to generate an idea, or because the idea generated was not useful) or if the agent instead chose to imitate, then the attraction measure for innovation is simply the attraction level from the previous period -i.e., A in i (t + 1) = A in i (t). 4 Similarly, a success or failure in imitation at t has the identical influence on A im i (t + 1) such that
otherwise. Given A in i (t) and A im i (t), one derives the choice probability of innovation in period t as follows:
The probability of imitation is, of course, 1 − q i (t). The expression in (2) says that a favorable experience through innovation (imitation) raises the probability that an agent will choose to innovate (imitate) again in the future.
The stage-2 attractions and the probabilities are derived similarly. Let B j i (t) be agent i's attraction to another agent j in period t. Its evolution follows the same rule as that of A in i (t) and
if otherwise. The probability that agent i observes agent j in period t is adjusted each period on the basis of the attraction measures, {B j i (t)} j6 =i :
for all i and for all j 6 = i. Agent i's success in imitating another agent j then further raises the probability that the same agent will be observed again relative to others.
There are two distinct sets of probabilities in our model. One set of probabilities, q i (t) and {p j i (t)} j6 =i , are endogenously derived and evolve over time in response to the personal experiences of agent i. Another set of probabilities, µ in i and µ im i , are exogenously specified and are imposed on the model as parameters. They control the capabilities of individual agents to independently innovate or to imitate someone else in the organization via social learning.
Modeling Turbulence in Task Environment
If the organization faced one fixed problem then all agents will eventually attain the global optimum through the search process described in the previous section. In such a case, the measure of performance for an individual is the speed with which the goal is achieved. In reality, however, most 4 There is actually a decay factor of φ in the equations of motion for the attractions such that
It is for the analytical simplicity that we assume φ = 1 (no decay) in our work. The same goes for A business organizations face a series of related problems, since the current problem they are working on may change due to a number of market factors such as the actions of competing firms, technological advances in another industry, or intertemporal changes in customer preferences. Rather than model agents as facing a fixed problem, we choose to model them as facing a series of related problems. For analytical tractability, this is done by allowing the problem itself to evolve stochastically over time.
Performance of an individual then depends not just on the speed with which a problem is solved, but also on how well he or she responds to an evolving environment.
Change or turbulence is specified in our model by first assigning an initial goal vector, b z(0), to the organization and then specifying a dynamic process by which it shifts over time. In period t, all agents have the common goal vector of b z(t). In period t + 1, the goal stays the same with probability σ and changes with probability (1 − σ). The shift dynamic of the goal vector is guided by the following stochastic process. The goal in t + 1, if different from b z(t), is then chosen iid from the set of points that lie both within the Hamming distance ρ of b z(t). The goal vector for the organization then stochastically shifts while remaining within Hamming distance ρ of the current goal. This allows us to control the possible size of the inter-temporal change. The lower is σ and the greater is ρ, the more frequent and variable is the change, respectively, in the organization's goal vector.
Design of Computational Experiments
The underlying simulation model specifies H = 24 and d = 4, so that there are 96 total bits in a methods vector and over 7.9 × 10 28 ( ∼ = 2 96 ) possibilities in the search space. For the organization, we consider a population of one hundred and fifty individuals: L = 150. These individuals are assumed to have heterogeneous learning skills such that µ in i and µ im i are independent random draws from a uniform distribution over [0, 1] and, once chosen, they remain fixed over the entire horizon.
We assume that the initial practices of the agents are completely homogeneous so that z i (0) =z j (0)∀i 6 = j. This is to ensure that any social learning (imitation) occurring over the horizon under study entails only newly generated knowledge. Otherwise, the initial variation in the information levels of the agents will induce some imitation activities, introducing unnecessary random noise into the system. The common initial methods vector is assumed to be an independent draw from {0, 1} Hd .
The parameters affecting the endogenous variables are σ and ρ -the frequency and magnitude of the environmental changes for the organization. We consider values of σ from {.5, .7, .8, .9} and ρ from {1, 3, 5, 9}.
The initial attraction stocks are set at B j i (0) = 1 for all i and for all j 6 = i, and A in i (0) = A im i (0) = 1 for all i. Hence, an individual, in t = 0, is equally likely to engage in innovation and imitationq i (0) = .5 -and has no inclination to observe one individual over another ex ante -i.e., p
∼ = .0067 in our experiments) for all i and for all j 6 = i.
All computational experiments carried out here assume a horizon of 15,000 periods. The timeseries of the performance measures are observed to reach a steady-state by the 2,000th period. 5 We measure the steady-state performance of individual i, denoted π i , to be the average over the last 5,000 periods of this horizon so that π i = 1 5,000 P 15,000 t=10,001 π i (t). Likewise, the steady-state values of other endogenous variables in the study are also computed as the average over the last 5,000 periods and denoted q i and p j i . Finally, all of the experiments were based on 100 replications, each using a fresh set of random numbers. 6 5 Endogenous Choice of Innovation vs. Imitation and the SteadyState Performance of the Agents
Baseline Analysis
For the baseline analysis, we specify σ = .9 and ρ = 1. Hence, there is a probability of .9 that the environment will remain unchanged from t to t + 1. If the environment changes, which occurs with the probability of .1, it involves a change in only one randomly chosen task.
We first ask what choices are made in the steady-state by the agents in terms of the learning mechanism -i.e., stage-1 choice between innovation (individual learning) and imitation (social learning). We then ask how these choices are affected by the innate learning skills of the agents, (µ in i , µ im i ).
Do agents with superior ability to innovate (imitate) necessarily choose innovation (imitation) with a greater probability? Remember that innovation and imitation are alternatives that compete directly against each other for agents' time and effort. If an agent chooses to innovate, it comes at the expense of imitation. In order to answer this question, we first look at the steady-state probability 5 By a "steady-state," we mean the state in which the mean value of the variable -i.e., mean across multiple replications -is independent of time. This is to be contrasted to "transient" periods, in which the mean value of the variable changes over time (presumably on its way to converge on some steady-state). 6 A replication is the running of the model for 15,000 periods given a set of random numbers. For each parameter configuration considered in this paper, the model is then run for a total of 1.5 million periods (15,000 periods per replication × 100 independent replications). of innovation, q i , for all agents. Since there are 150 agents per replication and we run 100 independent replications using a fresh set of random numbers for each replication, we have a total of 15,000 observations on q i . 7 For each observation of q i there is a (µ in i , µ im i ) pair, which is the innovation and imitation capabilities that agent i is endowed with. In Figure 2 , we plot the magnitude of q i as the grey-level of a point in the two-dimensional probability space, in which the horizontal and vertical coordinates capture the values of µ in i and µ im i , respectively. The lighter the grey-level of the dot, the higher is the value of q i . A distinct pattern emerges in this figure: an agent with a sufficiently high (low) level of µ im i tends to choose imitation with a high (low) probability -i.e., q i is lower. It is also notable that for a given level of µ in i the value of q i drops rather abruptly at some critical value of µ im i as µ im i is raised. The critical value of µ im i where such transition occurs appears to increase in µ in i .
In Figure 3 , we divide the probability range of [0, 1] into ten bins of equal size and report the percentage of the population (15,000 observations) who have q i in each bin. As can be seen, over 40%
of the population choose innovation with a probability less than .1 (and, hence, choose imitation with a probability greater than .9), while over 15% choose innovation with a probability greater than .9.
The rest of the population is divided rather evenly between the two extreme peaks. It is clear that the majority of agents tend toward either innovating or imitating full time rather than alternating evenly between the two learning mechanisms.
What is most striking about Figures 2 and 3 is the fact that a large proportion of the individuals in the population learn through imitation rather than innovation -over 70% of the population has 0 ≤ q i ≤ .5. Furthermore, the steady-state performance levels of the agents also turn out to depend more on their abilities to imitate than on their abilities to innovate. To see this, we collect the steady-state performance levels for all 150 agents from the 100 independent replications. This yields a total of 15,000 observations on π i , each coupled with a pair of values for (µ in i , µ im i ) that are specific to agent i. In order to achieve a clear display of the general relationship between agents' endowed learning skills and their steady-state performance levels, we fit a surface by applying the least-squares criterion to these observations. The resulting performance surface is shown in Figure 4 (a). The fitted equation which generated the surface is also provided. The contour plot of the surface is shown in Figure 4 (b). The performance level is then highest for those agents who have a high capability in imitation and a low capability in innovation. In fact, these agents appear to outperform those agents who are superior in both imitation and innovation. The agents who are highly capable in innovation but are deficient in imitation perform relatively poorly. As expected, the worst performance is attained by the agents who are deficient in both individual and social learning. In the next section, we ask how the environmental factors such as σ and ρ affect these properties.
Agent Types and Comparative Dynamics
Interpreting and reporting the comparative dynamics results at the level of individual agent for the entire population is a daunting task. For analytical and expositional simplicity, we then divide the population of agents into four mutually exclusive types [See Figure 5 ]:
Hence, S denotes the set of Super-agents who are superior in both innovation and imitation. N is the set of Innovators who are good at innovation but poor at imitation. M represents the group of Imitators who are good at imitation but poor at innovation. Finally, R is the group of Regular-agents who have modest abilities in both innovation and imitation. This typology is useful for summarizing the comparative dynamics results for the meaningfully defined sub-populations, instead of reporting them for each and every individual.
Using the above typology, we compute the steady-state values of the endogenous variables for each type as the simple averages over the values of all individuals belonging to the group:
where |G| is the size of the set G ∈ {S, N, M, R}. We compute b q G and b π G for each replication and then take their averages over the one hundred replications. for ρ ∈ {1, 3, 5, 9} given σ = .9. Likewise, Table 4 reports b π G for the same sets of (σ, ρ) configurations.
For all tables, the standard deviations (of b q G and b π G from 100 replications) are reported inside the parenthesis.
Property 2: (a) b q G is higher for agents of all types, when the environment is more turbulent (σ lower and ρ higher); Note that imitation entails copying from another agent an idea that was originally adopted by that agent for an environment that existed in the past. More specifically, the set of ideas from which a random draw is made under imitation is biased toward being adaptive to the past environment, while the ideas available for innovation are taken from the entire space of ideas and, hence, are unbiased.
For this reason, ideas copied from another agent tend to become obsolete at a faster rate when the environment is more turbulent. Consequently, a more turbulent environment promotes innovation (rather than imitation) as the more effective learning device for all types of agents -i.e., b q G is higher for all G when σ is lower and ρ is higher. Out of the four types, Innovators engage in innovation with the greatest intensity, while Imitators do so with the least intensity. Super-agents and Regular-agents pursue innovation with a moderate level of intensity. In a relatively stable environment where the common goal does not shift very much from one period to the next, Regular-agents tend to engage in innovation more than Super-agents. Super-agents find it more beneficial to utilize their high imitation capabilities in a relatively stable environment and refrain from engaging in innovation.
However, when the environment is highly turbulent, Super-agents find it necessary and desirable to substitute imitation with innovation as they are endowed with superior capacity to innovate.
Regular-agents, with their rather limited ability to innovate, are not able to respond to the turbulent environment with equal flexibility. 
An interesting observation is that
A more turbulent environment tends to throw the agents further away from the ever-changing optimum. Since a greater distance to the organizational goal implies poorer performance, it follows that an increase in environmental turbulence leads to deteriorating performance for all types of agents. In terms of the type-specific performance levels, it is highest for Imitators, followed by
Super-agents. Innovators, while ahead of Regular-agents, fall short of Super-agents and Imitators.
The group-level results here are fully consistent with the agent-level results captured in Figure 4 . It is clear that performance is positively affected by µ im i , while the relationship is non-monotonic with respect to µ in i .
Steady-State Structure of the Endogenous Social Learning Network
Given the prominent roles that the imitation capability, µ im i , and the intensity of imitation activity, 1 − q i , play in determining an agent's performance, we now probe deeper into the social learning process by investigating the exact structure of the social learning network that develops within the organization.
The raw materials we have in hand for inferring the network structure are the steady-state observation probabilities, {p j i } ∀j6 =i . Note that p j i represents the probability with which agent i observes another agent j in steady-state, given that he chooses to engage in social learning (imitation) rather than individual learning (innovation). For each of the 100 independent replications and for each agent i (from the population of 150 agents) we have 149 p j i 's, one for each agent j 6 = i. Our approach is to create (directed) links between the agents using these steady-state probabilities, thereby generating the network of social learning. For each replication, each with its own set of {p j i } ∀j6 =i , we generate 100 networks. Hence, a total of 10,000 networks are generated from 100 replications. 8 Investigating the average characteristics of the 10,000 networks that are specific to a given parameter configuration, and doing this for different parameter configurations, we determine the exact way in which various parameter configurations affect the structure and performance of the network.
How does one construct a network from the steady-state probabilities? A network is simply a set of realizations of the potential observation links between a pair of agents for all potential agent-agent pairs in the organization. To be more specific, let us define a two-dimensional probability space with µ in i captured along one dimension and µ im i along another. In this space, we can then represent the agents as nodes (points) and agent i observing another agent j with an arrow extending from a point
. Given the way we specify who observes (imitates) whom, the social learning network is a "directed" graph.
Given a population of 150 agents and the observed q i for all i, we first ask whether each agent chooses to innovate or imitate. If it is the former, then the agent observes no one. For those who choose to imitate, we ask whom they observe using {p j i } ∀j6 =i . The resulting network allows for some nodes (agents) in the graph having no directed link coming out of them, which implies that these agents have chosen to innovate. The target for agent i, call it target(i), is then defined as follows:
for all i. When agent i chooses to innovate, we have target(i) = i. Figure 6 offers visualization of a typical network generated with the steady-state probabilities from a replication. The singleton nodes in the lower right region are the agents who chose to innovate rather than to imitate someone else.
Once we have the targets for all agents in a given network, we define F (i) as the set of imitators (fans) of i such that
Following the standard approach in graph theory (Wasserman and Faust, 1994) , we define the degree of a node as the number of lines incident with the node. As we are dealing with the case in which the relationship between two agents is directed (who is observing whom), we define indegree and outdegree of a node. Indegree of a node, denoted δ I (i), is the number of nodes (different from i) that are adjacent to it -i.e., number of arrows pointing to node i. Outdegree of a node, denoted
, is the number of nodes that are adjacent from it -i.e., number of arrows pointing away from node i. In the context of our model, δ I (i) is equivalent to the size of F (i). Outdegree of a node is either zero (if target(i) = i) or one (if target(i) 6 = i). When all links in the network are accounted for, it must be that
Macro Structure of the Network

Network Density
The structure of the overall network can be captured with the network density, denoted ∆, which measures the degree of social learning in the system: ∆ ≡ Total No. of links between any two distinct agents, i and j
The denominator is the total number of agent-agent links that are possible in a population of L agents.
The numerator can be measured as either
, since they are identical. The resulting measure, ∆, then captures the extensiveness of imitation activities within the organization. Table 5 reports these values for various values of σ and ρ.
Property 4:
The density of the evolved network, ∆, is lower (higher) when the environment is more turbulent (stable).
This property follows directly from Property 2(a). Recall that a more turbulent environment gives rise to innovation as the preferred learning mechanism because the ideas copied through imitation tend to be biased and have a higher rate of obsolescence. It is then straightforward that the interagent links are less likely to form when the environment is more turbulent: The agents are much more likely to engage in innovations (individual learning) rather than in establishing connections and imitating others (social learning).
Network Centralization
Another important structural measure of a network is its degree of centralization. While the density of a network measures how extensive social learning is in a given network, the degree of network centralization measures how the flow of knowledge in a network originates from a select few individuals rather than from sources that are uniformly dispersed throughout the organization.
Note that the indegree of a node in the network captures how influential the individual is as a source of knowledge for others. If all individuals are equally influential in providing ideas for others, then the indegrees for all agents will be tightly clustered around the mean value. Such a network is said to be "decentralized" in that the abilities of individuals to influence others are more or less symmetric. On the other hand, when the abilities to influence are asymmetric so that some agents are more influential than others, the distribution of indegrees for all agents is likely to be more diffuse around the mean value. The wider the spread, the more "centralized" is the network.
A natural measure of the degree of network centralization is the variance in the distribution of indegrees for the population. The higher (lower) is the variance, the more centralized (decentralized) is the network. However, note that our objective is to explore the impact of environmental turbulence, σ and ρ, on the degree of centralization. As shown in Property 4, changes in σ and ρ affect the agents' stage-1 choices between innovation and imitation, q i , and, hence, the network density itself. The change in the network density makes it difficult to determine the relationship between environmental turbulence and the network centralization by simply observing the variance in the endogenous network for different values of σ and ρ. Instead, we create a random network that is counterpart of each endogenous network such that the variance of the indegrees in the endogenous network can be compared to that of the counterpart random network. The process of creating such a random network is described next.
Recall that for each replication we observe the steady-state probability of innovation, q i , for each can be created at this same point when we take the agents with δ O (i) = 1 and assign for each of them a link to another agent j(6 = i) on the basis of equal probabilities,
, over all j 6 = i. In other words, an agent who chooses to imitate in a random network observes another agent in the population with equal probabilities -no one individual is more likely to be selected than another. Since the target of observation for everyone is a random draw from uniform distribution, it is then clear that the distribution of indegrees in a random network should be clustered around the mean value for the population. Our conjecture is that the distribution of indegrees in an endogenous network is more spread around the mean value than that in a counterpart random network (which is considered to be "fully decentralized"). If this is true, then the next step is to examine how the difference in the spread is affected by the environmental turbulence, σ and ρ.
Let us denote by δ I the mean indegree for a given population of L agents:
Also denote by υ E δ the variance of the indegree distribution in an endogenous network such that
We shall denote by υ R δ the same measure for the counterpart random network.
Recall that for each (σ, ρ) configuration, we have 10,000 endogenous networks (and 10,000 counterpart random networks) generated. For each of the endogenous networks, we compute δ I and υ E δ and, then, average these over the 10,000 networks. To save on notations, we shall denote by δ I and υ E δ the resulting average values. Likewise, we compute δ I and υ R δ for each of the random network.
Since the random networks are created at the same time as the endogenous network, which is after the stage-1 choice of innovation vs. imitation has been made, the total number of links in the network will be the same for both types of networks. This means that δ I in a random network is identical to that in the counterpart endogenous network. υ R δ will be different, however, and can be averaged over the 10,000 random networks. Again, we shall save on notation by using υ R δ to denote the resulting average variance in the random networks. Table 6 (a) reports the values of δ I , υ E δ , and υ R δ for σ ∈ {.9, .8, .7, .5} given ρ = 1. Table 6(b) reports the same results for ρ ∈ {1, 3, 5, 9} given σ = .9. As conjectured, υ E δ is strictly greater than υ R δ for all considered values of σ and ρ such that the endogenous network is more centralized than the random network. The next property captures the impacts that σ and ρ have on the differential,
Property 5: A more stable environment -i.e., σ higher and ρ lower -leads to a more centralized social learning network.
Central to understanding Property 5 is the fact that the random network is taken to be fully decentralized because there is no one individual who is favored by others in the population -everyone is observed by others with equal probability. The degree of centralization for the endogenous network (relative to the fully decentralized random network) is then implied by the extent to which it deviates from the random network in terms of the variance in the distribution of indegrees. This deviation is larger when σ is higher and/or ρ is lower -i.e., the environment is more stable.
Micro Structure of the Network 6.2.1 Prestige of an Agent in the Endogenous Network
The prestige of an agent in our model is measured by the number of other agents who attempt to imitate him. This is the indegree of agent i, δ I (i). As the first step to understanding the micro structure of the social learning network, let us examine how the endowed learning skills of individual agents affect their prestige. Recall that we have 100 independent networks generated from each replication. Since each replication takes the endowed learning skills for the agents as fixed, we may take the 100 realized in-degrees (observed from the 100 generated networks) for each agent and average them. Given 100 independent replications, we then have 15,000 (=150 agents times 100 replications) observations on (µ in i , µ im i ) and δ I (i). Using these observations, we fitted a surface on the basis of the least-squares criterion. The fitted equation and the surface are shown in Figure 7 (a).
The contour plot of the surface is provided in Figure 7 (b).
It is interesting that the most heavily observed agents are the ones at the upper left cornerthose having high imitation skills but poor innovation skills. In fact, these highly imitative agents are held at higher levels of prestige than those agents who are superior in both innovation and imitation -those at the upper right corner -as well as the highly innovative agents with poor imitation skills (at the lower right corner). This high prestige of the M -type is the result of their success in copying others, which is clearly displayed in terms of their performance. The intuition is simple: By being good at copying successful ideas of others, the M -types emerge in the organization as the repository of good ideas for other agents to tap into. As shown previously in Figure 4 , agents who are good at imitating also tend to perform better than those who are good at innovating: It is easy to see that the general shape of the performance landscape (Figure 4 ) is similar to that of the in-degree surface ( Figure 7) . We, hence, conclude that there is a positive and strong correlation between the performance and prestige of an agent. [This confirms the empirical findings reported in Sparrowe, Liden, and Kraimer (2001).] In particular, the best performance and the highest prestige go to those individuals who are superior in imitation but poor in innovation. Conversely, those with superior innovation skills but poor imitation skills tend to perform rather poorly and, consequently, have low prestige.
To obtain the comparative dynamics results, we again work with the average values for the agents belonging to the four types of {S, N, M, R} such that Table 7 reports these values for various values of σ and ρ.
Property 6: (a) b δ G I is lower for agents of all types, when the environment is more turbulent (σ lower and ρ higher); 
Agent Types and the Endogenous Network Positions
We next investigate the endogenous role played by each individual in the network -in particular, how an individual's learning skills (type) contribute to the emergent role in the knowledge diffusion process. In the context of our model and the directed graph approach we are taking, we may define the following four categories for the endogenous roles of the agents:
• Agent i is a CONNECTOR, if there exist agents j(6 = i) and k(6 = i) such that target(j) = i and
• Agent i is a STAR, if target(i) = i and there exists another agent j(6 = i) such that target(j) = i.
• Agent i is a COPYCAT, if there exists an agent k(6 = i) such that target(i) = k, but there exists no other agent j(6 = i) such that target(j) = i.
• Agent i is LONER, if target(i) = i and there exists no other agent j(6 = i) such that target(j)
= i. Given these categories, we investigate how the endowed learning skills of the individual agents lead to their particular roles in the network. Tables 8 and 9 report the percentage of the population of a given type, G, playing a specific role in the network for all types and roles. The results are reported for σ ∈ {.5, .7, .8, .9} in Table 8 and for ρ ∈ {1, 3, 5, 9} in Table 9 .
The next two properties are directly observed from Tables 8 and 9 . Note that the environment is more turbulent (stable), when σ is lower (higher) and/or ρ is higher (lower). 
Concluding Remarks
There are two ways in which this paper contributed to the literature on social and organizational learning. First, we developed a formal model of social learning which enabled us to evolve social networks and characterize their emergent structures. In the process, we explored the extent to which the roles individuals come to play within a social/organizational system are determined by the innate skills they have as well as the characteristics of the surrounding environment. Second, our modeling approach made a methodological contribution to the literature on social network analysis.
As described in detail, the process of social learning was modelled in the context of evolving networks having probabilistic ties. This feature of the model distinguishes it from the existing models of social networks which treat the links between individuals as being deterministic. In this paper, we used the probabilities of ties for all agent-pairs to generate a set of endogenous networks. Their general structure could then be characterized using the traditional network analysis tools. This method allowed us to investigate how the inherent capabilities of the heterogeneous agents influence the development of social learning networks.
Several interesting findings emerged from this study. We will only mention a few in concluding this paper. Super-agents who are as skilled in innovation as Innovators devote less time to innovating than Innovators. Given their superior skills in both innovation and imitation, they find it privately beneficial to focus more on imitation. Having the extra skill for imitation means super-agents tend to outperform Innovators. However, we also find that Super-agents are outperformed by Imitators who are skilled in imitation but relatively poor at innovation. Possessing superior skills in both innovation and imitation is then a double-edged sword for Super-agents: Even though their strong imitation skill gives them an advantage over Innovators, their equally strong innovative skill induces them to pursue innovation to an excessive degree such that they end up generating (unintended) benefits to Imitators while incurring the implicit cost for themselves in the form of foregone values from imitating others.
The mean density of the endogenous networks was found to be lower when the organizational environment was more turbulent. The intuition is that the ideas copied from another agent, as opposed to those obtained through innovation, tend to become obsolete at a faster rate when the environment is turbulent. Consequently, there is less of a tendency for links to develop between individuals. It is also found that the network that forms tends to be more centralized when the environment is more stable.
Our modeling approach also allowed detailed examinations of the micro structure of the emergent social learning networks. In particular, we were able to explore the impacts that endowed learning skills have on the prestige of the individuals as well as their endogenous roles within the network.
An important result is that the highest prestige goes to Imitators who are superior in imitation but poor in innovation. By playing the role of connectors in the emergent network they prove essential to the efficient diffusion of knowledge in the organization. It is significant that the prestige held by The model presented here focused on the social learning network in a single organization. For that organization, the population of agents was also held fixed for the entire horizon under consideration. There are two ways in which the model can be enriched. First, social learning by individual agents can take place in a bigger social system containing multiple organizations. In this framework, an individual can then learn from another agent in the same organization or from an agent in another
organization. An important factor to be considered in this setting is the (highly likely) possibility that the organizations may have different goals and, hence, the comparative value of internal versus external social learning is likely to depend on the scale and scope of the inter-organizational heterogeneities. Second, the agents are likely to be mobile in real organizations. New agents may join an organization, while some existing agents may exit it. Modelling and exploring the endogenous transformation of the social learning network when the identities of the agents (nodes) are constantly changing is a highly challenging task that is left for future research. Probability that agent i chooses to innovate in t 1 − q i (t)
Probability that agent i chooses to imitate in t p j i (t)
Probability that agent i observes agent j in t (a) σ ∈ {.9, .8, .7, .5}, ρ = 1 Network Density (∆) σ = . 9 .00450262 σ = . 8 .00418023 σ = . 7 .00384497 σ = . 5 .00352342
(b) Given σ = .9
Network Density (∆) ρ = 1
.00450262 ρ = 3
.00387411 ρ = 5
.00352759 ρ = 9
.00312257 Table 6 : Network Centralization (a) σ ∈ {.9, .8, .7, .5}, ρ = 1 
